Managerial myopia and corporate social responsibility:Evidence from the textual analysis of chinese earnings communication conferences

被引:5
作者
Ding, Hui [1 ]
Jiang, Fuwei [1 ]
Zhang, Shan [1 ]
Zhang, Zhining [1 ]
机构
[1] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Managerial myopia; Textual analysis; CSR; Sustainable development; PERFORMANCE; INSTRUMENTS; INNOVATION; HORIZON;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbef.2024.100886
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) plays an important role in developing countries achieving sustainable goals. Using the textual analysis of Chinese earnings communication conferences, we investigate whether the managers' time horizons influence CSR performance. We find that the level of managerial myopia is negatively related to CSR scores. This deleterious impact manifests asymmetrically under diverse expectations. Furthermore, guided by the CSR pyramid theory, our findings suggest that managerial myopia undermines both financial and legal responsibilities, subsequently exerting an influence on the commitment to social responsibility. Compensation incentives can effectively mitigate the deleterious impacts associated with myopia. Nevertheless, heightened external pressures originating from capital and product markets may impose constraints on managers' time horizons, thereby amplifying the adverse repercussions of myopia.
引用
收藏
页数:14
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