Does a CEO's ability to hedge affect the firm's payout policy?

被引：0
作者：
Dunham, Lee M. [1 ]
Wei, Sijing
Zhang, Jiarui [2 ]
机构：
[1] Creighton Univ, Heider Coll Business, 2500 Calif Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178 USA
[2] SUNY Coll Brockport, Sch Business & Management, 350 New Campus Dr, Brockport, NY 14420 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE | 2023年 / 47卷 / 02期
关键词：
Executive compensation; Managerial hedging; Firm risk; Restricted stock; Unrestricted stock; Payout policy; Dividends; INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET; RISK REDUCTION; EQUITY SWAPS; DIVIDEND; COMPENSATION; DETERMINANTS; INCENTIVES;
D O I：
10.1007/s12197-022-09614-7
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We examine whether a CEO's composition of firm stockholdings between restricted and unrestricted shares impacts the firm's payout policy. We document a positive and statistically significant relationship between measures of payout policy and the proportion of CEO total shareholdings that are unrestricted, and this positive relationship holds for alternative measures of payout. This result supports the notion that the composition of a CEO's portfolio of firm stock between restricted and unrestricted shares is a significant determinant of the firm's payout policy.
引用
收藏
页码：303 / 322
页数：20
相关论文
共 33 条
[1]   Executive stock-based compensation and firms' cash payout: the role of shareholders' tax-related payout preferences [J].
Aboody, David ;
Kasznik, Ron .
REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES, 2008, 13 (2-3) :216-251
[2]   RISK REDUCTION AS A MANAGERIAL MOTIVE FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGERS [J].
AMIHUD, Y ;
LEV, B .
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1981, 12 (02) :605-617
[3]   The Economics of Managerial Taxes and Corporate Risk-Taking [J].
Armstrong, Christopher S. ;
Glaeser, Stephen ;
Huang, Sterling ;
Taylor, Daniel J. .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2019, 94 (01) :1-24
[4]   The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives [J].
Armstrong, Christopher S. ;
Larcker, David F. ;
Ormazabal, Gaizka ;
Taylor, Daniel J. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2013, 109 (02) :327-350
[5]   Why Do Insiders Hedge Their Ownership? An Empirical Examination [J].
Bettis, Carr ;
Bizjak, John ;
Kalpathy, Swaminathan .
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2015, 44 (03) :655-683
[6]   Managerial ownership, incentive contracting, and the use of zero-cost collars and equity swaps by corporate insiders [J].
Bettis, JC ;
Bizjak, JM ;
Lemmon, ML .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 2001, 36 (03) :345-370
[7]   Executive equity swaps and corporate insider holdings [J].
Bolster, P ;
Chance, D ;
Rich, D .
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 1996, 25 (02) :14-&
[8]   Dividend policy, creditor rights, and the agency costs of debt [J].
Brockman, Paul ;
Unlu, Emre .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 92 (02) :276-299
[9]   Equity-incentive compensation and payout policy in Europe [J].
Burns, Natasha ;
McTier, Brian C. ;
Minnick, Kristina .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2015, 30 :85-97
[10]   The impact of board gender composition on dividend payouts [J].
Chen, Jie ;
Leung, Woon Sau ;
Goergen, Marc .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2017, 43 :86-105
1234