Asymmetry of individual activity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

被引:2
作者
Gao, Bo [1 ]
Tao, Kexin [2 ]
Mu, Chunjiang [3 ]
Chu, Chen [4 ]
Li, Hao [3 ]
机构
[1] Inner Mongolia Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Comp Informat Management, Hohhot 010070, Inner Mongolia, Peoples R China
[2] Inner Mongolia Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business Adm, Hohhot 010070, Inner Mongolia, Peoples R China
[3] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Cybersecur, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[4] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat & Math, Kunming 650221, Yunnan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
EVOLUTION; SELECTION; RULES;
D O I
10.1063/5.0160264
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
We consider an aspiration-based asymmetric individual activity co-evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game model on the square lattice. In detail, each player has an individual weight that evolves with its strategy. We introduce an asymmetric setting that only mu fractions of players in the network chosen to be active can update their individual weights according to whether their payoffs satisfy their aspirations. Therefore, our individual weights can be regarded as a type of intrinsic motivation satisfaction. Through Monte Carlo simulations on the square lattice, our co-evolution mechanism has been proven to significantly promote cooperation. Furthermore, we find that the moderate mu leads to the highest cooperation level. By dividing the players into four types according to their strategies and weights, we prove that the inversion of the dominant relationship between cooperators and defectors with low weights leads to a conversion cycle of the four types of players, which enhances spatial reciprocity to promote cooperation. Moderate mu results in an appropriate number of low-weight players in this cycle. Interestingly, our results show that higher weight heterogeneity does not lead to higher levels of cooperation, which is contrary to the intuition formed in the previous work.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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