From the Meinongian Point of View

被引：0

作者：

Sendlak, Maciej ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Warsaw, Dept Philosophy, Warsaw, Poland

来源：

LOGIC AND LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY | 2023年 / 32卷 / 02期

关键词：

Alexius Meinong; Peter van Inwagen; Willard van Orman Quine; non-existent objects; quantifiers;

D O I：

10.12775/LLP.2022.028

中图分类号：

B81 [逻辑学（论理学）];

学科分类号：

010104 ; 010105 ;

摘要：

In this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen's charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear.

引用

页码：243 / 251

页数：9

共 16 条

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