Organization of the State: Home Assignment and Bureaucrat Performance

被引:4
作者
Xu, Guo [1 ]
Bertrand, Marianne [2 ]
Burgess, Robin [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, 2220 Piedmont Ave, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[3] London Sch Econ, Dept Econ, London, England
关键词
SOCIAL INCENTIVES; CONNECTIONS; AUTHORITY; PAY;
D O I
10.1093/jleo/ewab022
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1471 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975 and 2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be less effective and more likely to be suspended. These negative effects are driven by states with higher levels of corruption and cohorts with greater numbers of home state officers. (JEL: J45, O43, D73, M5)
引用
收藏
页码:371 / 419
页数:49
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