The Question of the Limits of Cognition in Kant's Philosophy
被引:0
|
作者:
Rimkus, Edvardas
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Vilnius Gediminas Tech Univ, Fac Creat Ind, Dept Philosophy & Cultural Studies, Vilnius, LithuaniaVilnius Gediminas Tech Univ, Fac Creat Ind, Dept Philosophy & Cultural Studies, Vilnius, Lithuania
Rimkus, Edvardas
[1
]
机构:
[1] Vilnius Gediminas Tech Univ, Fac Creat Ind, Dept Philosophy & Cultural Studies, Vilnius, Lithuania
来源:
STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA KANTIANA
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2023年
/
01期
关键词:
Apriorism;
Thing in Itself;
Metaphysical Nominalism;
Experience;
Cognition;
Transcendental Consciousness;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号:
01 ;
0101 ;
摘要:
The article examines the question of the limits of cognition arising in Kant's theoretical philosophy, expressed by the concepts of "thing in itself", "noumenon", "transcendental object", and others. The conception of cognitive limits is analyzed within the context of Kant's reconstructed theory of experience. The links between the idea of the "thing in itself", and the Kantian concept of empirical knowledge as a synthesis between the material of sensory experience and the conceptual form are discussed. The concept of "metaphysical nominalism" is introduced in the interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge, and certain social aspects are brought into the theory of transcendental consciousness, which is important in Kant's conception of experience. Epistemological and ontological aspects of Kant's comprehension of the limits of cognition are distinguished by analyzing Kant's understanding of natural science and metaphysical cognition.
机构:
Univ Calif San Diego, Philosophy Dept, 9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093 USAUniv Calif San Diego, Philosophy Dept, 9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA