Can government supervision alleviate the deviation of enterprises from the real economy to the financial sector: Evidence from China

被引:1
作者
Liang, Shangkun [1 ]
Xue, Weizhi [1 ]
Yang, Dan [2 ]
机构
[1] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accountancy, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Normal Univ, Business Sch, 19 Xinjiekouwai St, Beijing 100875, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
central state-owned enterprise; deviation of enterprises from the real economy to the financial sector; governance effect; government supervision; internal control deficiencies; CORRUPTION; FIRMS; INSPECTIONS; INVESTMENT; OWNERSHIP; AUDITS; CASH;
D O I
10.1111/ecpo.12279
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In China, the deviation of enterprises from the real economy to the financial sector has raised concerns. Using a sample of listed companies held by central state-owned enterprises from 2009 to 2018, we investigate the influence of government supervision on this deviation. We find that government supervision effectively reduces investments in financial assets by central state-owned enterprises. The impact is more significant in enterprises with internal control deficiencies, especially in those related to finance. Further study finds that the effect of government supervision conducted for the first time, second time, and third time shows a decreasing trend.
引用
收藏
页码:989 / 1019
页数:31
相关论文
共 41 条
[1]   Macroeconomic and institutional determinants of financialisation of non-financial firms: Case study of Turkey [J].
Akkemik, K. Ali ;
Ozen, Sukru .
SOCIO-ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2014, 12 (01) :71-98
[2]   The cash flow sensitivity of cash [J].
Almeida, H ;
Campello, M ;
Weisbach, MS .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2004, 59 (04) :1777-1804
[3]   Global financial crisis: The challenge to accounting research [J].
Arnold, Patricia J. .
ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY, 2009, 34 (6-7) :803-809
[4]   Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians [J].
Avis, Eric ;
Ferraz, Claudio ;
Finan, Frederico .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2018, 126 (05) :1912-1964
[5]   1995 Wharton survey of derivatives usage by US non-financial firms [J].
Bodnar, GM ;
Hayt, GS ;
Marston, RC .
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 1996, 25 (04) :113-&
[6]   Cash holdings and R&D smoothing [J].
Brown, James R. ;
Petersen, Bruce C. .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2011, 17 (03) :694-709
[7]   Monitoring: Which institutions matter? [J].
Chen, Xia ;
Harford, Jarrad ;
Li, Kai .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 86 (02) :279-305
[8]   The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations [J].
Claessens, S ;
Djankov, S ;
Lang, LHP .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 58 (1-2) :81-112
[9]   Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows, financial market structure, and banking crises [J].
Copelovitch, Mark ;
Singer, David A. .
ECONOMICS & POLITICS, 2017, 29 (03) :179-208
[10]   Financialization of the Economy [J].
Davis, Gerald F. ;
Kim, Suntae .
ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY, VOL 41, 2015, 41 :203-221