Executives' overseas background and corporate green innovation

被引:48
作者
Chen, Wen [1 ]
Zhu, Yufeng [2 ]
Wang, Chenyu [3 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Agr Univ, Coll Finance, 1 Weigang, Nanjing 210095, Peoples R China
[2] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, 555 Liutai Ave, Chengdu 611130, Peoples R China
[3] Renmin Univ China, Sch Finance, 59 Zhongguancun St, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
air pollution; corporate green innovation; excess compensation; executives' overseas background; FOREIGN EXPERIENCE; UPPER ECHELONS; AIR-POLLUTION; AGENCY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; GROWTH; FIRM; COMPENSATION; ORIENTATION; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1002/csr.2345
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines the impact of executives' overseas background on corporate green innovation and the possible adverse selection problem in attracting overseas-returned executives to high-polluted cities. Based on the data from Chinese listed companies between 2002 and 2018, we empirically find that executives' overseas background has a significantly positive impact on corporate green innovation. In addition, it is found that air pollution results in the loss of overseas-returned executives, while the effect of executives' overseas background in stimulating corporate green innovation is more prominent in high-polluted cities, indicating that high-polluted cities should make more efforts to attract returnees. Therefore, we further explore the policy influence of executives' excess compensation and find that excess compensation in high-polluted cities weakens the positive impact of executives' overseas background, although it increases the effectiveness of importing overseas-returned executives, which means that the adverse selection caused by excess compensation in high-polluted cities is non-negligible.
引用
收藏
页码:165 / 179
页数:15
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