AI Carbon Footprint Management with Multi-Agent Participation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on a Case in China

AI is playing an important role in promoting sustainable development, but the carbon footprint caused by AI is scaling quickly and may partly offset the effort to reduce carbon emissions. However, recommendations for limiting the AI carbon footprint are lacking. In order to address this gap in the literature, this paper first constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model by taking governments, AI industry alliances, and consumers into consideration, and then exploring the impacts of key factors on these three players' strategy selection based on the case of smart air conditioner consumption in China. The results show that the behavior of governments has an important influence on the behavior of AI industry alliances and consumers. The ideal consequence is that governments adopt an unregulated strategy, AI industry alliances adopt a green development strategy, and consumers adopt a green purchase strategy. Regulation by governments is indispensable for limiting the AI carbon footprint during an early stage but becomes dispensable when the system reaches an optimal state. Although a tendency toward green consumption, image benefit, regulatory cost, carbon price, and the subsidies given to consumers and AI industry alliances can largely influence the strategy selection of governments, governments are most sensitive to carbon prices and the subsidies given to consumers. AI industry alliances are not sensitive to subsidies, reputation improvement, and reputation loss but are most sensitive to carbon prices. Consumers are most sensitive to green consumption tendencies, self-satisfaction, and utility but are not sensitive to subsidies.