Executive team heterogeneity and the moral hazard of equity pledging: Evidence from China

被引:4
|
作者
Yuan, Yue [1 ]
机构
[1] Leshan Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Leshan, Peoples R China
关键词
Executive management team heterogeneity; Equity pledge; Moral hazard; TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; PERFORMANCE; INNOVATIVENESS; DIVERSITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.frl.2022.103371
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study empirically examines the relationship between executive team heterogeneity and equity pledge moral hazard using data about Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020. We find that increasing top management team heterogeneity (including financial background, overseas background, educational background, gender, and age) can significantly reduce equity pledge moral hazard, while also finding a moderating effect from executive compensation. Our research can help listed companies manage the moral hazards associated with equity pledges from the perspective of the executive team, such as personnel arrangements and compensation adjustments.
引用
收藏
页数:6
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Executive team heterogeneity, equity pledges, and stock Price crash risk: Evidence from China
    Li, Ziyang
    Han, Ning
    Zeng, Qing
    Li, Yu
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2022, 84
  • [2] The effect of executive team heterogeneity on firms' total factors of production: Evidence from China
    Huang, Xiaozhi
    Yao, Yuanhu
    RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE, 2024, 70
  • [3] Executive Heterogeneity, Executive Power and Selection of Equity Incentive Mode: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
    Li, Miao
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD CHINESE CONTROL AND DECISION CONFERENCE (CCDC 2021), 2021, : 3433 - 3439
  • [4] Collateral damage: Evidence from share pledging in China
    Luo, Danglun
    Piao, Zhirong
    Wu, Cen
    Zhang, Frank Feida
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2024, 93
  • [5] Financing constraints and the cost of equity: Evidence on the moral hazard of the controlling shareholder
    Luo, Qi
    Li, Hui
    Zhang, Biao
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2015, 36 : 99 - 106
  • [6] Corporate Equity Refinancing and Cash Dividend in China Based on the Perspective of Moral Hazard
    Qin Jian
    Zhou Yan
    Gao Yanyan
    Yang Wenyue
    2014 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SERVICE SYSTEMS AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT (ICSSSM), 2014,
  • [7] ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN EQUITY PARTNERSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM HOLLYWOOD'S SLATE FINANCING AGREEMENTS
    Opitz, Christian
    Hofmann, Kay H.
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 2014, 23 (04) : 811 - 838
  • [8] Share pledging and optimism in analyst earnings forecasts: Evidence from China
    Hu, Jun
    Long, Wenbin
    Luo, Le
    Peng, Yuanhuai
    JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2021, 132
  • [9] Top Management Team Education Experience Heterogeneity and Corporate Innovation: Evidence from China
    Yuan, Rongli
    Li, Wanshan
    Xia, Shengjie
    AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2025,
  • [10] Teamwork and Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Emergency Department
    Chan, David C.
    JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2016, 124 (03) : 734 - 770