Judicial Specialization and Deference in Asylum Cases on the US Courts of Appeals

被引:1
作者
Stobb, Maureen [1 ,2 ]
Kennedy, Joshua b. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Georgia Southern Univ, Statesboro, GA USA
[2] Georgia Southern Univ, Dept Polit Sci & Int Studies, Statesboro, GA 30458 USA
关键词
DECISION-MAKING; CHEVRON; IDEOLOGY; ADJUDICATION; EXPERTISE; POLITICS; LAW;
D O I
10.1017/S0003055423001144
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Many look to the federal courts as an avenue of control of the growing administrative state. Some advocate the creation of specialized federal courts of appeals in areas such as immigration and social security. Yet, little is known about whether repeat exposure to specific types of cases enables federal judges to overcome doctrines of deference and whether such an effect would be policy-neutral. Gathering a sample of over 4000 cases decided by the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 2002 and 2017, we demonstrate that exposure to asylum cases over time emboldens federal judges to challenge administrative asylum decisions, asserting their personal policy preferences. The effect is particularly strong when the legal issue should prompt deference based on bureaucratic expertise. These findings not only address important questions raised by bureaucracy and court scholars but also inform a salient public debate concerning the proper treatment of those seeking refuge within our borders.
引用
收藏
页码:1733 / 1747
页数:15
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