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Do firms with specialized M&A staff make better acquisitions?
被引:7
|作者:
Gokkaya, Sinan
[1
,2
]
Liu, Xi
[3
]
Stulz, Rene M.
[2
,4
,5
]
机构:
[1] Ohio Univ, Coll Business, Athens, OH 45701 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, 2100 Neil Ave, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] Miami Univ, Farmer Sch Business, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[5] European Corp Governance Inst, Brussels 1000, Belgium
关键词:
Mergers and acquisitions;
Acquisitions;
Corporate takeover market;
Corporate development;
M&
A staff;
FREE CASH FLOW;
AGENCY PROBLEMS;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
MANAGEMENT-PRACTICES;
FINANCIAL ADVISERS;
CEO OVERCONFIDENCE;
INVESTMENT BANKER;
MERGERS;
PERFORMANCE;
TARGET;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.09.002
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We open the black box of the M&A decision process by examining whether specialized M&A staff, who perform a wide range of acquisition-related functions, improve acquisi-tion performance. We find that the presence and the quality of specialized M&A staff is one of the most economically important determinants of acquisition performance. We ex-plore mechanisms through which specialized M&A staff improve acquisition performance and investigate why only less than half of US firms employ such staff. Agency costs are a first-order determinant for specialized M&A staff's value-creation role. Such staff do not improve acquisition performance in firms with heightened agency conflicts.(c) 2022 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码:75 / 105
页数:31
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