CIPHERH: Automated Detection of Ciphertext Side-channel Vulnerabilities in Cryptographic Implementations

被引:0
作者
Deng, Sen [1 ]
Li, Mengyuan [2 ]
Tang, Yining [1 ]
Wang, Shuai [3 ]
Yan, Shoumeng [4 ]
Zhang, Yinqian [1 ]
机构
[1] Southern Univ Sci & Technol, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH USA
[3] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Ant Grp, Hangzhou, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 32ND USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM | 2023年
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The ciphertext side channel is a new type of side channels that exploits deterministic memory encryption of trusted execution environments (TEE). It enables the adversary with read accesses to the ciphertext of the encrypted memory, either logically or physically, to compromise cryptographic implementations protected by TEEs with high fidelity. Prior studies have concluded that the ciphertext side channel is a severe threat to not onlyAMD SEV-SNP, where the vulnerability was first discovered, but to all TEEs with deterministic memory encryption. In this paper, we propose CIPHERH, a practical framework for automating the analysis of cryptographic software and detecting program points vulnerable to ciphertext side channels. CIPHERH is designed to perform a practical hybrid analysis in production cryptographic software, with a speedy dynamic taint analysis to track the usage of secrets throughout the entire program and a static symbolic execution procedure on each "tainted" function to reason about ciphertext side-channel vulnerabilities using symbolic constraint. Empirical evaluation has led to the discovery of over 200 vulnerable program points from the state-of-the-art RSA and ECDSA/ECDH implementations from OpenSSL, MbedTLS, andWolfSSL. Representative cases have been reported to and confirmed or patched by the developers.
引用
收藏
页码:6843 / 6860
页数:18
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