Must Skepticism Remain Refuted? Inheriting Skepticism with Cavell and Levinas

被引：0
作者：
Altonji, Alexander [1 ]
机构：
[1] New Sch Social Res, New York, NY 10011 USA
来源：
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY | 2023年 / 42卷 / 01期
关键词：
Stanley Cavell; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Emmanuel Levinas; Skepticism; Responsibility; WITTGENSTEIN;
D O I：
10.1007/s11245-022-09849-3
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
This article defends Cavell and Levinas' view that anti-skeptical arguments cannot attain universal assent. In the first half of the article, I argue that Conant's reading of Cavell is mistaken in two respects: he ignores Cavell's inheritance of Kant as well as the differences Cavell emphasizes between external world and other minds skepticism. In the second half of the paper, I examine affinities between Cavell and Levinas' thought, viz., acknowledging the facticity of the other and their remarks on skepticism. I close the paper by noting three metaphysical and ethical truths that arise from Cavell's way with skepticism.
引用
收藏
页码：61 / 72
页数：12
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