CEO incentive compensation and stock price momentum

被引：0

作者：

Wang, Jian ^{[1
]}

Huang, Yanhuang ^{[1
]}

Feng, Hongrui ^{[2
]}

Li, Xingjian ^{[3
]}

Yan, Shu ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Northeastern Univ, Sch Business Adm, Dept Finance, Shenyang, Peoples R China

[2] Penn State Behrend, Black Sch Business, Dept Finance, Erie, PA 16563 USA

[3] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Econ, Dept Finance, Hangzhou, Peoples R China

[4] Oklahoma State Univ, Spears Sch Business, Dept Finance, Stillwater, OK USA

来源：

ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2023年 / 63卷

关键词：

CEO incentive compensation; CEO traits; information manipulation; information uncertainty; momentum; RISK-TAKING INCENTIVES; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CAREER CONCERNS; CASH HOLDINGS; PERFORMANCE; MARKET;

D O I：

10.1111/acfi.13035

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We document strong evidence that CEO incentive compensation can predict the significance of stock price momentum through discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation. The profit of momentum strategy increases with CEO pay-for-performance incentive, but decreases with CEO risk-taking incentive. It also evaluates the effects of information uncertainty on such relationship. The evidence is more significant for firms with older and longer tenured CEOs and firms with more informed traders. The relationship between the profit of momentum strategy and CEO pay-for-performance incentive is stronger among CEOs without the risk-taking incentive. Our results are robust for different sub-samples based on before and after Reg FD and Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity. Further, our findings are consistent with the information diffusion explanation of momentum and the agency theory that incentivised CEOs tend to manipulate information by smoothing good news, concealing mildly bad news and accelerating the disclosure of extremely bad news.

引用

页码：975 / 1028

页数：54

共 124 条

[1] CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures
Aboody, D
Kasznik, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2000, 29 (01) : 73 - 100
[2] Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered
Aggarwal, RK
Samwick, AA
[J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (01) : 71 - 118
[3] Dissecting stock price momentum using financial statement analysis
Ahmed, Anwer S.
Safdar, Irfan
[J]. ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, 2018, 58 : 3 - 43
[4] CEO incentive compensation and earnings management The implications of institutions and governance systems
Almadi, Madi
Lazic, Philip
[J]. MANAGEMENT DECISION, 2016, 54 (10) : 2447 - 2461
[5] [Anonymous], 2000, NBER Working Paper Number 7808
[6] SOME TESTS OF SPECIFICATION FOR PANEL DATA - MONTE-CARLO EVIDENCE AND AN APPLICATION TO EMPLOYMENT EQUATIONS
ARELLANO, M
BOND, S
[J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1991, 58 (02) : 277 - 297
[7] ANOTHER LOOK AT THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION OF ERROR-COMPONENTS MODELS
ARELLANO, M
BOVER, O
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 1995, 68 (01) : 29 - 51
[8] Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Armstrong, Christopher S.
Vashishtha, Rahul
[J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2012, 104 (01) : 70 - 88
[9] Momentum and credit rating
Avramov, Doron
Chordia, Tarun
Jostova, Gergana
Philipov, Alexander
[J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2007, 62 (05) : 2503 - 2520
[10] BABER WR, 1991, ACCOUNT REV, V66, P818

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 →