Settled: Patent characteristics and litigation outcomes in the pharmaceutical industry

被引:0
作者
Ahn, Kiefer [1 ]
Trujillo, Antonio [2 ]
Gibbons, Jason [1 ]
Bennett, Charles L. [3 ]
Anderson, Gerard [1 ]
机构
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Hlth Policy & Management, 624 N Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205 USA
[2] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Int Hlth, 624 N Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205 USA
[3] Univ South Carolina, Coll Pharm, 715 Sumter St CLS 311J, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
关键词
Pharmaceutical drugs; Patent protection; Paragraph IV settlement; INNOVATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.irle.2023.106169
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A pharmaceutical company that seeks to produce a generic version of a brand drug before patent expiration can trigger a Paragraph IV litigation. However, generic and brand companies may avoid litigation through settlement, which sometimes involves payment to the generic company to delay generic entry. This behavior would be problematic if the settlement option was used to protect patents with low social value. This study explores the relationship between Paragraph IV litigation characteristics and the probability of a Paragraph IV settlement. Examining Paragraph IV settlements from 2003 to 2020, we find that the number of patents being litigated and the years of remaining market exclusivity are the strongest predictors of settlement. Moreover, we find no statistically significant relationship between active ingredient patents and settlement. This information may be helpful to regulators intending to promote the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
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页数:5
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