Inflation and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Institutions

被引:5
作者
Mignamissi, Dieudonne [1 ]
Bikoula, Seraphin Brice Minkoe [2 ]
Thioune, Thierno [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Yaounde II, Fac Econ, Soa, Cameroon
[2] Univ Dschang, Fac Econ, Dschang, Cameroon
[3] Cheikh Anta Diop Univ, Fac Econ, Dakar, Senegal
关键词
Economic growth; Inflation; Institutions; PSTR; Sub-Saharan Africa; E00; E02; O10; O11; POLITICAL INSTABILITY; DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; TRADE OPENNESS; MEDIATION; DEMOCRACY; MATTER;
D O I
10.1007/s40953-023-00366-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The objective of this paper is to revisit the non-linearity of the inflation-growth relationship in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on the role of institutional quality apprehended by the level of democracy. Empirically, we used the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model to estimate the optimal inflation threshold from which the inflation-growth relationship changes sign. In a rather particular way, we appreciate the sensitivity of the estimation of the optimal threshold according to three modalities of the political regime, namely the democratic regime, the anocratic regime and the authoritarian regime. Over the period 2002-2015, we arrive at the following main findings: 1. the inflation-growth non-linearity is validated, attesting to a single inflation threshold or two inflation regimes; 2. the optimal inflation threshold is estimated at 12.23% in Sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, the inflation-growth relationship is positive (negative) for any level of inflation below (above) this threshold; 3. the mediating effect of institutions, captured by the quality of the political regime, is significant in explaining the nonlinear inflation-growth relationship in Sub-Saharan Africa. This result also shows that the weight of the mediating effect of the political regime is greater in authoritarian regimes. Based on these results, a set of policies is advised.
引用
收藏
页码:847 / 871
页数:25
相关论文
共 88 条
[1]   The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Johnson, S ;
Robinson, JA .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (05) :1369-1401
[2]   Democracy Does Cause Growth [J].
Acemoglu, Daron ;
Naidu, Suresh ;
Restrepo, Pascual ;
Robinson, James A. .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2019, 127 (01) :47-100
[3]  
Acemoglu D, 2012, NEW YORK REV BOOKS, V59, P85
[4]   On the Interpretation and Use of Mediation: Multiple Perspectives on Mediation Analysis [J].
Agler, Robert ;
De Boeck, Paul .
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, 2017, 8
[5]   Political instability and inflation volatility [J].
Aisen, Ari ;
Veiga, Francisco Jose .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 2008, 135 (3-4) :207-223
[6]   Does political instability lead to higher inflation? A panel data analysis [J].
Aisen, Ari ;
Veiga, Francisco Jose .
JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 2006, 38 (05) :1379-1389
[7]   COMPETITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND THE OPTIMAL SEIGNIORAGE [J].
AIZENMAN, J .
JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 1992, 24 (01) :61-71
[8]   On the nonlinear relationship between inflation and growth: A theoretical exposition [J].
Arawatari, Ryo ;
Hori, Takeo ;
Mino, Kazuo .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 2018, 94 :79-93
[9]  
Babatunde M.A., 2011, Asian-African Journal of Economics and Econometrics, V11, P147
[10]   The Nexus Between Democracy and Economic Growth: Evidence from Dynamic Simultaneous-Equations Models [J].
Baklouti, Nedra ;
Boujelbene, Younes .
JOURNAL OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, 2018, 9 (03) :980-998