Lenders' pricing strategy: Do neighborhood risks matter?

被引:2
作者
Agarwal, Sumit [1 ]
Deng, Yongheng [2 ]
He, Jia [3 ]
Wang, Yonglin [4 ]
Zhang, Qi [5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Business Sch, Singapore, Singapore
[2] Univ Wisconsin, Wisconsin Sch Business, Madison, WI USA
[3] Nankai Univ, Digital Econ Interdisciplinary Sci Ctr, Sch Finance, Tianjin, Peoples R China
[4] Lingnan Univ, Dept Econ, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[5] Nankai Univ, Sch Finance, Tianjin, Peoples R China
[6] Nankai Univ, Sch Finance, Tongyan Rd 38,Haihe Educ Pk, Tianjin 300350, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
loan pricing; mortgage securitization; neighborhood effect; prepayment risk; refinancing waves; MORTGAGE DEFAULT; BANK CONCENTRATION; ADVERSE SELECTION; SECURITIZATION; RATES;
D O I
10.1111/1540-6229.12421
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article explores the different pricing strategies of lenders who originate both government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) and non-GSE loans. We find that conditional on loan and borrower characteristics and some observable local economic factors, mortgage rates on GSE loans vary significantly across regions. However, we observe no sizable regional variation in loan amounts or default risk. By contrast, the mortgage rates on non-GSE loans depend almost entirely on borrowers and loan characteristics. In addition, we find that spatial variations in GSE mortgage rates are highly responsive to regional prepayment risk. Our results are robust to various controls for neighborhood characteristics, including regional-level bank competition, borrower accessibility to mortgages, and household income levels. Overall, the findings offer a novel insight into how lenders adjust pricing strategies in response to a changing lending environment. The results provide implications relating to the present and imminent dangers of housing bubbles and the intensified refinancing wave following the COVID-19 pandemic.
引用
收藏
页码:1011 / 1047
页数:37
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