Feasible solution to discrete-time linear quadratic stochastic Stackelberg difference game

被引:1
|
作者
Qi, Qingyuan [1 ]
Zhang, Qianqian [2 ]
Sun, Yue [1 ]
机构
[1] Harbin Engn Univ, Qingdao Innovat & Dev Ctr, Qingdao 266000, Peoples R China
[2] Qingdao Univ, Inst Complex Sci, Sch Automat, Qingdao, Peoples R China
基金
中国博士后科学基金;
关键词
discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game; feasible solution; forward and backward stochastic difference equations; maximum principle; STRATEGIES;
D O I
10.1002/asjc.3266
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the discrete-time linear quadratic (LQ) stochastic Stackelberg game, which has not been thoroughly addressed in previous literature. Firstly, we derive the maximum principle for the stochastic Stackelberg difference game using the variational method, and obtain the necessary and sufficient solvability conditions. However, due to the coupling between the two players and the presence of stochastic noise, obtaining explicit optimal leader and follower's strategies becomes challenging. Therefore, we present a feasible suboptimal control strategy instead. As a result, we derive a feasible suboptimal control strategy. To achieve this, we assume a linear homogeneous relationship to decouple the group of stochastic game forward-backward stochastic differential equations (SG-FBSDEs), which serves as a compromise for obtaining the optimal solution. With this approach, we derive a feasible solution to the stochastic Stackelberg difference game based on the solution to symmetric Riccati equations.
引用
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页码:1442 / 1458
页数:17
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