Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation

被引:32
|
作者
Jin, Tao [1 ]
Jiang, Yulian [2 ]
Liu, Xingwen [2 ]
机构
[1] Southwest Minzu Univ, Coll Elect Engn, Key Lab Elect Informat State Ethn Affairs Commiss, Chengdu 610041, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[2] Southwest Minzu Univ, Coll Elect Engn, Chengdu 610041, Sichuan, Peoples R China
关键词
New energy vehicles; Dual credit policy; Evolutionary game theory; System dynamics; Hotelling; ELECTRIC VEHICLES; STRATEGIES; SIMULATION; BEHAVIOR; GREEN;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2022.127677
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
To discuss how to promote the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) through low regulatory costs after the removal of financial subsidies, in this paper, an evolution-ary game model between local governments and vehicle manufacturers is developed. In the model, we suppose a series of parameters based on academic research and practical situations. Then the model and its parameters are analyzed and verified by system dy-namics simulation. The study shows that: (1) Compared with the static, the dynamic dual credit policy enables the system to have an equilibrium stability point, which helps the development of NEVs. (2) The cost of local government regulation is reduced by the effec-tive implementation of the dynamic dual credit policy. (3) After the removal of financial subsidies, consumers focus on personal experience. Therefore, government and enterprises should focus on technological breakthroughs and infrastructure development.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:14
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