The power of framing: The role of information provision in promoting whistleblowing

被引:3
作者
Novaro, Riccardo [1 ]
Nasi, Greta [2 ,3 ]
Cucciniello, Maria [2 ]
Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan [4 ]
机构
[1] Scuola Super Sant Anna, Inst Management, Pisa, Italy
[2] Bocconi Univ, Dept Social & Polit Sci, Milan, Italy
[3] Bocconi Univ, SDA Bocconi Sch Management, Publ Serv Behav Lab, Milan, Italy
[4] Univ Utrecht, Sch Governance, Utrecht, Netherlands
关键词
PUBLIC-SECTOR; PROSPECT-THEORY; INTENTION EVIDENCE; COGNITIVE BIASES; DETERMINANTS; ABSENTEEISM; DECISION; ORGANIZATIONS; RISK; LIKELIHOOD;
D O I
10.1111/padm.12977
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Whistleblowing policies are seldom effective in inducing civil servants to report misconduct. While current literature focusses more upon the identification of the chief factors that prevent witnesses from reporting, it overlooks potentially effective strategies to stimulate active behavior. In particular, it neglects the framing and impact of information provision. According to the prospect theory, information that frames the consequences of non-reporting as negative is more effective in enhancing the intention to report misconduct, as opposed to information that frames the consequences of reporting as positive. This study tested these propositions through an online survey experiment targeted at the civil servants of a major European city. We exposed participants to four different frames of economic and psychological consequences of reporting wrongdoing, in order to analyze the impact of various frames upon participants' reporting intentions. The results of this study confirm the relevance of the prospect theory and clearly indicate how the presentation of information affects active behavior. Le politiche sul whistleblowing raramente sono efficaci nello stimolare i dipendenti pubblici a segnalare comportamenti illeciti. La letteratura corrente si concentra infatti maggiormente sull'identificazione dei principali fattori che dissuadono i testimoni dal segnalare, trascurando strategie potenzialmente efficaci in grado di stimolarne un comportamento proattivo; in particolare, quelle relative all'impatto dell'erogazione di informazioni e del relativo framing. Secondo la teoria dei prospetti, inquadrare le conseguenze di una mancata segnalazione con un framing negativo e piu efficace nello stimolare la propensione a segnalare illeciti rispetto ad un framing positivo. Questo studio ha testato queste ipotesi attraverso un approccio sperimentale, con un questionario online rivolto ai dipendenti pubblici di una grande citta europea. Abbiamo esposto i partecipanti a quattro diversi frames relativi alle conseguenze economiche e psicologiche del segnalare illeciti, al fine di analizzare l'impatto di tali trattamenti sulla loro propensione a segnalare. I risultati confermano la rilevanza della teoria dei prospetti e indicano chiaramente come la modalita di presentazione delle informazioni possa incidere sul comportamento.
引用
收藏
页码:1342 / 1365
页数:24
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