Cross ownership, union bargaining with managerial delegation, and stakeholders conflicts

被引：6

作者：

Wu, Di ^{[1
]}

Sun, Ji ^{[2
]}

Wang, Leonard F. S. ^{[3
]}

Yang, Can ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Nankai Univ, Sch Econ, Inst Int Econ, Tianjin, Peoples R China

[2] Hubei Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan, Peoples R China

[3] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Wenlan Sch Business, 182 Nanhu Ave, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China

来源：

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2024年 / 45卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

STRATEGIC DELEGATION; MARKET-STRUCTURE; COURNOT; CONTRACTS; BERTRAND; DUOPOLY; TRADE;

D O I：

10.1002/mde.4031

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we examine when the owners negotiate union bargaining and delegate production to managers, showing that an increasing degree of cross ownership exacerbates the conflicting interests between the owners and consumers. If the bargaining power of the union is weak, the owners will choose to bargain with the union and delegate to managers simultaneously. Otherwise, the owners will bargain with the union first and then set delegate incentives to managers.

引用

页码：726 / 733

页数：8

共 22 条

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