机构:
Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, Plon, Germany
Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, D-24306 Plon, GermanyMax Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, Plon, Germany
Rossetti, Charlotte S. L.
[1
,2
]
Hilbe, Christian
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机构:
Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, Plon, GermanyMax Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, Plon, Germany
Hilbe, Christian
[1
]
机构:
[1] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, Plon, Germany
[2] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, D-24306 Plon, Germany
direct reciprocity;
evolution of cooperation;
evolutionary game theory;
human behavior;
reciprocal altruism;
REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA;
RATIONAL COOPERATION;
PROMOTE COOPERATION;
NETWORK STRUCTURE;
SOCIAL DILEMMAS;
REPEATED GAMES;
REPEATED PLAY;
STRATEGY;
EVOLUTION;
BEHAVIOR;
D O I:
10.1111/eth.13407
中图分类号:
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号:
04 ;
0402 ;
摘要:
Direct reciprocity is the tendency to repay others' cooperation. This tendency can be crucial to maintain cooperation in evolving populations. Once direct reciprocity evolves, individuals have a long-run interest to cooperate, even if it is costly in the short run. The major theoretical framework to describe reciprocal behavior is the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Over the past decades, this game has been the major workhorse to predict when reciprocal cooperation ought to evolve, and which strategies individuals are supposed to adopt. Herein, we compare these predictions with the empirical evidence from experiments with human subjects. From a theory-driven perspective, humans represent an ideal test case, because they give researchers the most flexibility to tailor the experimental design to the assumptions of a model. Overall, we find that theoretical models describe well in which situations people cooperate. However, in the important case of "indefinitely repeated games," they have difficulties to predict which strategies people use. The prisoner's dilemma.image
机构:
IST Austria, A-3400 Klosterneuburg, AustriaIST Austria, A-3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
Hilbe, Christian
Martinez-Vaquero, Luis A.
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机构:
Natl Res Council Italy, Inst Cognit Sci & Technol, I-00185 Rome, ItalyIST Austria, A-3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
Martinez-Vaquero, Luis A.
Chatterjee, Krishnendu
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IST Austria, A-3400 Klosterneuburg, AustriaIST Austria, A-3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
Chatterjee, Krishnendu
Nowak, Martin A.
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机构:
Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAIST Austria, A-3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
机构:
Sony Comp Sci Labs Inc, Tokyo 1410022, Japan
Okinawa Inst Sci & Technol Grad Univ, Onna Son, Okinawa 9040412, JapanCarnegie Mellon Univ, Human Comp Interact Inst, Sch Comp Sci, Pittsburgh, PA 15206 USA
Kasahara, Shunichi
Christakis, Nicholas A.
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机构:
Yale Univ, Yale Inst Network Sci, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Yale Univ, Dept Sociol, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Yale Univ, Dept Stat & Data Sci, New Haven, CT 06520 USACarnegie Mellon Univ, Human Comp Interact Inst, Sch Comp Sci, Pittsburgh, PA 15206 USA