Pricing and low-carbon decisions in an uncertain supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation

被引:0
|
作者
Yan, Guangzhou [1 ]
Ni, Yaodong [2 ]
机构
[1] Hebei Agr Univ, Coll Sci, Baoding, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Informat Technol & Management, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Supply chain management; Pricing decision; Cap-and-trade; Low-carbon; Stackelberg game; EMISSION REDUCTION DECISIONS; COMPETITION; NETWORK; MODELS; RETAILERS; POLICIES; DESIGN;
D O I
10.3233/JIFS-232607
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
This paper studies the pricing and low-carbon decision problems in a supply chain containing a manufacturer and a downstream retailer. The manufacturer produces a single product under the cap-and-trade scheme. We formulate the price and carbon-concerned demand function. To maximize their revenue, the manufacturer and the retailer determine their selling prices and carbon emission reduction rates separately. Due to the fast product updates speed, some parameters do not have enough historical data. For example, the sales cost of the retailer, the demand of consumers, and the total carbon emissions of manufacturers are far from frequency stability. This fact makes the distribution function obtained in practice usually deviate from the frequency. They are all uncertain variables whose distributions are estimated from the empirical data of experts or managers. In this paper, we give three decentralized game models to explore the equilibrium behaviors in the corresponding decision environment under an uncertain environment. Corresponding analytical solutions are offered under different game scenarios. Finally, numerical experiments are performed to illustrate the effectiveness of the established models and yield some remarkable insights.
引用
收藏
页码:2877 / 2897
页数:21
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Pricing decisions in a socially responsible supply chain under carbon cap-and-trade regulation
    Zhang, Zhi-chao
    Li, Kevin W.
    Liu, Zhi
    Huang, Jun
    IFAC PAPERSONLINE, 2019, 52 (13): : 331 - 336
  • [2] Decision models of pricing and carbon emission reduction for low-carbon supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation
    Cai, Jianhu
    Jiang, Feiying
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2023, 264
  • [3] Pricing and carbon reduction decisions for a new uncertain dual-channel supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation
    Liu, Naiqi
    Tang, Wansheng
    Lan, Yanfei
    Pei, Huili
    FUZZY OPTIMIZATION AND DECISION MAKING, 2024, 23 (03) : 415 - 448
  • [4] Equilibrium pricing mechanism of low-carbon supply chain considering carbon cap-and-trade policy
    Zou, Hao
    Qin, Jin
    Zheng, Hong
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2023, 407
  • [5] Joint Pricing and Product Carbon Footprint Decisions and Coordination of Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Regulation
    Cheng, Yonghong
    Xiong, Zhongkai
    Luo, Qinglin
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2018, 10 (02)
  • [6] A low-carbon supply chain pricing mechanism considering CSR under carbon cap-and-trade policy
    Zou, Hao
    Xiao, Jin
    Lou, Yuanyuan
    Liao, Dan
    Deng, Huwei
    Jiang, Jiehui
    PLOS ONE, 2024, 19 (10):
  • [7] Financing Strategy of Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint under Cap-and-Trade Regulation
    Lu, Changli
    Zhao, Ming
    Khan, Imran
    Uthansakul, Peerapong
    CMC-COMPUTERS MATERIALS & CONTINUA, 2021, 66 (01): : 437 - 455
  • [8] Joint encroachment and low-carbon propaganda decisions in a platform supply chain under cap-and-trade regulations
    Zhao, Nenggui
    Wang, Jing
    Pan, Yinghao
    Wang, Qiang
    Min, Jie
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH, 2025,
  • [9] Low-carbon production with low-carbon premium in cap-and-trade regulation
    Du, Shaofu
    Tang, Wenzhi
    Song, Malin
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2016, 134 : 652 - 662
  • [10] Optimal pricing and green decisions in a dual-channel supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation
    Man Yang
    Tao Zhang
    Yuhao Zhang
    Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 2022, 29 : 28208 - 28225