Introduction to Robert Aumann's Talk at the Colloquium

被引：0

作者：

Weibull, Jorgen ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden

来源：

REVUE ECONOMIQUE | 2023年 / 74卷 / 04期

关键词：

common knowledge; correlated equilibrium; repeated games;

D O I：

10.3917/reco.744.0651

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This is a transcript of the speech, given on October 11, 2021, at the Colloquium in Honor of Robert Aumann at the University of Paris-Pantheon-Assas to introduce the final speaker: Robert Aumann.

引用

页码：651 / 654

页数：4

共 9 条

[1] The logic of backward induction [J].

Arieli, Itai ;

Aumann, Robert J. .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2015, 159 :443-464

[2]

Aumann R, 1959, ANN MATH STUD, VIV, P287, DOI [10.1515/9781400882168-018, DOI 10.1515/9781400882168-018]

[3]

Aumann R J., 1974, J. Math. Econ., V1, P67, DOI DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8

[4] CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J].

AUMANN, RJ .

ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (01) :1-18

[5] AGREEING TO DISAGREE [J].

AUMANN, RJ .

ANNALS OF STATISTICS, 1976, 4 (06) :1236-1239

[6] A synthesis of behavioural and mainstream economics [J].

Aumann, Robert J. .

NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOUR, 2019, 3 (07) :666-670

[7] Common knowledge, salience and convention: A reconstruction of David Lewis' game theory [J].

Cubitt, RP ;

Sugden, R .

ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 2003, 19 (02) :175-210

[8] RULE-UTILITARIANISM, RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS AND THE THEORY OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR [J].

HARSANYI, JC .

THEORY AND DECISION, 1980, 12 (02) :115-133

[9]

Lewis D. K., 1969, CONVENTION PHILOS ST

← 1 →