RegTech Adoption and the Cost of Capital

被引:12
作者
Lai, Sandy [1 ]
Lin, Chen [2 ]
Ma, Xiaorong [3 ]
机构
[1] Natl Taiwan Univ, Coll Management, Taipei 106, Taiwan
[2] Univ Hong Kong, Fac Business & Econ, Lung Fu Shan, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Macau, Fac Business Adm, Taipa, Macau, Peoples R China
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
RegTech; information acquisition cost; cost of capital; liquidity; corporate governance; EDGAR; IMPLIED COST; INFORMATION ACQUISITION; STOCK RETURNS; EARNINGS; MARKET; EQUILIBRIUM; ASK; EXPECTATIONS; INVESTORS; ACCRUALS;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2022.4660
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper studies the cost of capital effect of a major regulatory technology, or RegTech, event: the staggered implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the period from 1993 to 1996. This event represents a largely exogenous shock to corporate information dissemination technologies, resulting in a considerable reduction in information acquisition costs for investors. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we show that the cost of equity capital declines substantially after a firm switches from paper filing to mandatory electronic filing in EDGAR. The effect is stronger for small firms and firms with low analyst coverage and low institutional ownership. We identify three channels through which EDGAR affects a firm's cost of capital: the liquidity, risk-taking, and corporate governance channels. EDGAR implementation also improves a firm's investment efficiency significantly. We find evidence that the marginal value of a firm's capital investment and cash is higher during the post-EDGAR period.
引用
收藏
页码:309 / 331
页数:24
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