机构:
Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
Xiamen Univ, Ctr Accounting Studies, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R ChinaXiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
Chen, Jiguang
[1
,2
]
Hu, Qiying
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R ChinaXiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
Hu, Qiying
[3
]
Shi, Duo
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Management & Econ, Shenzhen 518172, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Shenzhen Finance Inst, Shenzhen 518000, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaXiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
Shi, Duo
[4
,5
]
Zhang, Fuqiang
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机构:
Washington Univ St Louis, Olin Business Sch, St Louis, MO 63130 USAXiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
Zhang, Fuqiang
[6
]
机构:
[1] Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[2] Xiamen Univ, Ctr Accounting Studies, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[3] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[4] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Management & Econ, Shenzhen 518172, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[5] Shenzhen Finance Inst, Shenzhen 518000, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[6] Washington Univ St Louis, Olin Business Sch, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
quick response;
supply chain;
strategic inventory;
demand learning;
SME fashion retailer;
SUPPLY CHAIN;
INFORMATION ACQUISITION;
INVENTORY;
COMMITMENT;
QUALITY;
CHANNEL;
D O I:
10.1287/msom.2021.0561
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
Problem definition: Quick response is a classic operations strategy that allows a retailer to place a rapid replenishment order during the selling season using information learned from early sales. The benefits of quick response are widely studied in the literature under the condition that the manufacturer's wholesale prices are exogenously given. Motivated by the practice of emerging small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) fashion brands, this paper revisits the value of quick response for a retailer when a manufacturer can strategically set its wholesale prices. Methodology/results: We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. In contrast to the traditional quick response setting, the manufacturer can dynamically adjust wholesale prices for both regular and replenishment orders. First, we investigate whether and when quick response still benefits the retailer. We find that, under low or significantly high demand uncertainties, the firms share a common preferred ordering strategy, and quick response benefits the retailer as well as the supply chain. But, under moderately high demand uncertainty, the retailer's favored ordering strategy conflicts with the manufacturer's interest; as a result, the manufacturer would set wholesale prices to counter the retailer's ordering strategy, which makes quick response detrimental to the retailer. Second, we search for mechanisms that can resolve this conflict and restore the beneficial effect of quick response. We show that letting the manufacturer commit to wholesale prices up front is ineffective in fixing the problem. However, if the retailer can propose a take-it-or-leave-it wholesale price for the replenishment order (possibly with the replenishment quantity) once the regular wholesale price is set, then quick response leads to a win-win outcome for both firms. Managerial implications: The findings caution retailers with weak power (e.g., SMEs) when adopting quick response, especially when facing moderately high demand uncertainties. The retailer, although weak, should be aware of the retailer's natural ability to propose replenishment terms because, otherwise, the retailer can always forgo quick response; this opens up an opportunity to design more favorable arrangements.
机构:
Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USAUniv Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
Caro, Felipe
;
Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Navarra, IESE Business Sch, Barcelona 08034, SpainUniv Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
机构:
Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USAUniv Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
Caro, Felipe
;
Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Navarra, IESE Business Sch, Barcelona 08034, SpainUniv Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA