共 23 条
Equilibrium analysis of a partially observable priority queue
被引:2
作者:
Kim, Bara
[1
]
Kim, Jeongsim
[2
]
Bueker, Ole
[1
]
机构:
[1] Korea Univ, Dept Math, 145 Anam Ro, Seoul 02841, South Korea
[2] Chungbuk Natl Univ, Dept Math Educ, 1 Chungdae Ro, Cheongju 28644, South Korea
基金:
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词:
Priority queue;
Equilibrium strategy;
Evolutionarily stable equilibrium;
STRATEGIES;
IMPACT;
D O I:
10.1016/j.cie.2023.109434
中图分类号:
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号:
081203 ;
0835 ;
摘要:
This study considers a single-server Markovian queue with preemptive priority discipline. In front of a server, two queues are formed: a normal queue for ordinary customers and a priority queue for priority customers. When a customer arrives, they can observe the length of the normal queue, but not the priority queue. By considering the length of the normal queue and the expected waiting time in the priority queue, an arriving customer will choose either the priority queue by paying a priority fee or the normal queue for free. We investigate the customers' equilibrium strategies. Specifically, we find the necessary and sufficient conditions for a threshold-type strategy to be an equilibrium. We also investigate the stability of equilibria. In addition, we examine the effect of information disclosure regarding the length of the priority queue on equilibrium behavior.
引用
收藏
页数:12
相关论文