A Survey of Capacity Mechanisms: Lessons for the Swedish Electricity Market

被引:6
作者
Holmberg, Par A. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Tangeras, Thomas [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Res Inst Ind Econ IFN, Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Univ Cambridge, Energy Policy Res Grp EPRG, Cambridge, England
[3] Stanford Univ, Program Energy & Sustainable Dev PESD, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Capacity mechanism; Capacity market; Strategic reserve; Resource; adequacy; Wholesale electricity market; EQUILIBRIUM; RELIABILITY; AUCTIONS; DEMAND; DESIGN;
D O I
10.5547/01956574.44.6.phol
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Many electricity markets use capacity mechanisms to support producers. Capacity payments can mitigate imperfections associated with "missing money" in the spot market and solve transitory capacity shortages caused by investment cycles, regulatory changes, or technology shifts. We discuss capacity mechanisms used in electricity markets around the world. We argue that correctly designed strategic reserves are likely to be more efficient than market-wide capacity mechanisms in jurisdictions that rely on substantial amounts of variable renewable energy and hydro power for electricity supply, such as Sweden.
引用
收藏
页码:275 / 304
页数:30
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