The Revolving Door and Access to the European Commission: Does the Logic of Influence Prevail?

被引:2
作者
Belli, Sharon S. S. [1 ]
Beyers, Jan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Antwerp, Dept Polit Sci, Sint Jacobstr 2, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
access; European Commission; interest groups; lobbying; revolving door; CIVIL-SOCIETY; UNION; DIVERSITY; DEMOCRACY;
D O I
10.1111/jcms.13486
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article analyses to what extent and under which conditions revolving door practices relate to access to the European Commission (EC). The revolving door hypothesis is analysed by combining two data sources: a dataset with publicly available records about the meetings between interest organizations and senior EC officials and evidence collected through the Comparative Interest Group-survey (CIG-survey). It is especially in professionalized organizations, where staff and organizational leadership dominate, that we observe a significant positive relationship between revolving door practices and access. In contrast, the extent to which the membership decides on political positioning and advocacy strategies has no impact on the relationship between revolving door and access. These results show that the revolving door is primarily connected with a logic of influence, implying that revolvers are especially advantageous for professionalized organizations.
引用
收藏
页码:186 / 204
页数:19
相关论文
共 51 条
[1]   Prioritizing professionals? How the democratic and professionalized nature of interest groups shapes their degree of access to EU officials [J].
Albareda, Adria .
EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2020, 12 (04) :485-501
[2]   Organizing Transmission Belts: The Effect of Organizational Design on Interest Group Access to EU Policy-making [J].
Albareda, Adria ;
Braun, Caelesta .
JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 2019, 57 (03) :468-485
[3]   Connecting Society and Policymakers? Conceptualizing and Measuring the Capacity of Civil Society Organizations to Act as Transmission Belts [J].
Albareda, Adria .
VOLUNTAS, 2018, 29 (06) :1216-1232
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2001, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE
[5]   STRATEGIC MODELS OF TALK IN POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING [J].
AUSTENSMITH, D .
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1992, 13 (01) :45-58
[6]   The revolving door in Brussels: a process-oriented approach to employee recruitment by interest organisations [J].
Belli, Sharon S. ;
Bursens, Peter .
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 2023, 30 (01) :128-149
[7]   Looking for 'Voice' in Business and Citizen Groups: Who's Being Heard? [J].
Berkhout, Joost ;
Hanegraaff, Marcel ;
Maloney, William A. .
POLITICAL STUDIES, 2023, 71 (03) :545-572
[8]   Is the EU different? Comparing the diversity of national and EU-level systems of interest organisations [J].
Berkhout, Joost ;
Hanegraaff, Marcel ;
Braun, Caelesta .
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 2017, 40 (05) :1109-1131
[9]   Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process [J].
Bertrand, Marianne ;
Bombardini, Matilde ;
Trebbi, Francesco .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2014, 104 (12) :3885-3920
[10]   The Comparative Interest Group-survey project: design, practical lessons, and data sets [J].
Beyers, Jan ;
Fink-Hafner, Danica ;
Maloney, William A. ;
Novak, Meta ;
Heylen, Frederik .
INTEREST GROUPS & ADVOCACY, 2020, 9 (03) :272-289