Institutional reform paths

被引：0
|
作者：
Buchen, Clemens [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Econ Grp, Vallendar, Germany
[2] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Vallendar, Germany
来源：
ECONOMICS & POLITICS | 2023年 / 35卷 / 03期
关键词：
macroeconomic political economy; microfoundations of political economy; property rights; reform; stabilization; social choice; PERSISTENCE; POLICY;
D O I：
10.1111/ecpo.12252
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper develops a dynamic population game in which agents play a simple anonymous-exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with a higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (institutional quality of contract law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy. Based on the theoretical model, the paper predicts which types the reformer should enact first and under which conditions reform will not be successful.
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页码：1099 / 1121
页数：23
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