MOTIVATING USER-GENERATED CONTENT: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INCENTIVE THRESHOLDS
被引:3
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作者:
He, Liuyi
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机构:
Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
He, Liuyi
[1
]
Luo, Jifeng
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机构:
Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
Luo, Jifeng
[1
]
Tang, Yisong
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机构:
Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
Tang, Yisong
[1
]
Wu, Zhiyan
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机构:
Shanghai Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Management, Shanghai, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
Wu, Zhiyan
[2
]
Zhang, Han
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机构:
Georgia Inst Technol, Scheller Coll Business, Atlanta, GA USAShanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
Zhang, Han
[3
]
机构:
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Georgia Inst Technol, Scheller Coll Business, Atlanta, GA USA
Monetary rewards;
incentive thresholds;
unintended consequences;
online aesthetic medicine community;
user-generated content;
natural experiment;
WORD-OF-MOUTH;
MONETARY INCENTIVES;
NATURAL EXPERIMENT;
SOCIAL INCENTIVES;
FIELD EXPERIMENT;
PERFORMANCE;
PARTICIPATION;
COMMUNITIES;
BEHAVIOR;
REVIEWS;
D O I:
10.25300/MISQ/2022/17369
中图分类号:
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号:
0812 ;
摘要:
While monetary rewards have been widely used by online platforms to motivate user-generated content (UGC) contributions, users may not always demonstrate the expected behaviors. Unintended consequences of reward policies, exemplified by unchanged or reduced UGC contributions, may occur. Through two natural experiments, this study investigates the implications of providing users with an incentive structure that rewards users' continued contribution according to the volume of UGC. Using a unique data set on two completion-contingent incentive programs from a popular online aesthetic medicine platform, we examine user responses to reward thresholds. We found that after users reach a threshold to obtain a monetary reward, they are less likely to continue contributing UGC, suggesting a minimal-effort effect. Our findings indicate that social approval from peers helps to mitigate unintended user responses to monetary reward policies. We also observed that monetary rewards primarily improve the quality and website traffic of low-to moderate-quality contributions.
机构:
Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Texas Dallas, Naveen Jindal Sch Management, Dallas, TX 75230 USA
机构:
Rey Juan Carlos Univ, Dept Business Econ, Madrid, SpainRey Juan Carlos Univ, Dept Business Econ, Madrid, Spain
Saura, Jose Ramon
Dwivedi, Yogesh K.
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机构:
Swansea Univ, Sch Management, Swansea, Wales
Symbiosis Int, Symbiosis Inst Business Management, Pune, IndiaRey Juan Carlos Univ, Dept Business Econ, Madrid, Spain
Dwivedi, Yogesh K.
Palacios-Marques, Daniel
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Politecn Valencia, Dept Business Org, Valencia, SpainRey Juan Carlos Univ, Dept Business Econ, Madrid, Spain