Bribery in emerging economies: an integration of institutional and non-market position perspective

被引：15

作者：

Lu, Jiangyong ^{[1
]}

Choi, Seong-jin ^{[2
]}

Jimenez, Alfredo ^{[3
]}

Bayraktar, Secil ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China

[2] Hanyang Univ, Sch Business, Seoul 133791, South Korea

[3] KEDGE Business Sch, 680 Cours Liberat, F-33405 Talence, France

[4] TBS Business Sch, 1 Pl Alphonse Jourdan, F-31068 Toulouse, France

来源：

ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT | 2023年 / 40卷 / 01期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Firm corruption; Residual control theory; Nonmarket position; Institutions; TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP CHOICE; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; CORRUPTION; STRATEGY; COMPETITION; BUSINESS; MNES; PARTICIPATION;

D O I：

10.1007/s10490-021-09782-w

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this paper we build on the residual control theory and examine the interdependence of countries' institutional environment and firms' nonmarket positions towards firm corruption. Based on World Bank data from emerging economies spanning from 2006 to 2018, we find that the interaction between lower quality market-supporting institutions and firm's weaker positions makes firms more vulnerable to bribery requests, consequently leading to their involvement in bribery. This mediated interaction effect occurs due to the interplay between the demand- and supply-side of corruption, highlighting how firms' relative nonmarket positions and the institutional context jointly shape the firms' incentive for bribery activities.

引用

页码：205 / 242

页数：38

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