Congressional Pay and Responsiveness in the Antebellum US House of Representatives

被引:0
|
作者
Baughman, John [1 ]
机构
[1] Bates Coll, Dept Polit, Lewiston, ME 04240 USA
关键词
CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS; STRATEGIC POLITICIANS; ELECTORAL CONNECTION; ELECTIONS; COMPETITION; GOVERNMENT; CAREERISM; ACCOUNT; CONTEXT;
D O I
10.1017/S0898588X2200013X
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
From the first attempt to raise congressional pay in 1816, voters have judged members harshly for increasing their own compensation. During debates on the Compensation Act of 1856, members acknowledged that the experience of 1816 still loomed over them, though they disagreed about whether the lesson was not to increase pay or not to replace the per diem with a salary. In the end, they did both. Unlike the "salary grabs" of 1816 and 1873, however, few were punished directly by voters and the law was not repealed. The splintering of the party system allowed representatives to shift responsibility and obscure accountability. The timing of elections and addition of anticorruption provisions further limited backlash. Senators recognized the electoral jeopardy of representatives and so built a broad multiparty coalition for passage. While representatives were sensitive to the judgment of voters, the brief period of a multiparty Congress aided adoption of salary-based compensation in spite of that judgment, making possible later moves toward professionalization.
引用
收藏
页码:74 / 87
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条