Can Conservatives Be Persuaded? Framing Effects on Support for Universal Basic Income in the US

被引:9
作者
Yeung, Eddy S. F. [1 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
关键词
Universal basic income; Framing; Conservatism; Welfare; Public opinion; PUBLIC-OPINION; PREFERENCES; WELFARE; MOBILITY; POLICY; REDISTRIBUTION; DETERMINANTS; INEQUALITY; ATTITUDES; IDEOLOGY;
D O I
10.1007/s11109-022-09824-z
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Universal basic income (UBI) has been proposed as a policy response to technological advances and structural inequality. Yet, recent data show that most conservatives in Europe and the US are strongly opposed to the welfare proposal. Can framing UBI as a policy that conforms to their ideological predispositions overcome such opposition? Exploiting the compatibility of UBI with core conservative ideals such as individualism and laissez-faire government, I design an original survey experiment that randomly exposes respondents to one of two frames: (1) an equalizing-opportunity frame which emphasizes that UBI creates a level playing field and promotes self-responsibility, or (2) a limiting-government frame which highlights UBI as a policy that limits government and reduces bureaucracy. I find that American conservatives-identified by using 10 policy statements-remained strongly opposed to UBI even after they were presented with such frames. Analyses of open-ended responses, which show that how conservatives explained their opposition to UBI remained unchanged regardless of framing, reinforce this conclusion. Conservatives' opposition to UBI remained rigid, even after the key components of UBI that fit the conservative ideology were accentuated. These results shed light on the political feasibility of framing UBI, and the rigidity of welfare attitudes among American conservatives.
引用
收藏
页码:135 / 161
页数:27
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