Do prospector firms pay more dividends in times of high policy uncertainty?

被引:1
作者
Hoang, Viet Anh [1 ]
Nguyen, Thanh Huong [2 ]
Nguyen, My Hanh [1 ]
Truong, Ba Thanh [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ, Univ Danang, Dept Banking, Da Nang, Vietnam
[2] Univ Econ, Univ Danang, Fac Finance, Da Nang, Vietnam
[3] Univ Econ, Univ Danang, Dept Accounting, Da Nang, Vietnam
来源
COGENT BUSINESS & MANAGEMENT | 2024年 / 11卷 / 01期
关键词
Business strategy; dividend payments; overinvestment; capital expenditure; information and governance environments; policy uncertainty; Collins Ntim; University of Southampton; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Strategic Management; Management Communications; FREE CASH FLOW; BUSINESS STRATEGY; AGENCY COSTS; POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1080/23311975.2024.2332496
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This research aims to explore the nexus between business strategy and dividend payments. Utilizing a dataset encompassing U.S.-listed firms spanning the period from 1995 to 2018, our analysis reveals that firms employing prospector strategies exhibit a higher propensity for dividend payments compared to defender firms. Our findings persist even when accounting for firm fixed effects, employing an alternative subsample methodology, and demonstrating resilience to endogeneity and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis. We also document that agency conflict issues related to free cash flow in prospector firms, stemming from overinvestment and capital expenditure reduction, contribute to an escalation in dividend payouts relative to defender firms. Finally, the prospector-dividend payment association is more pronounced in the context of weaker firm-level information and governance environments and during periods characterized by high policy uncertainty. Overall, our study fills a crucial gap in the literature on the complexities of dividend decisions within the context of different strategic orientations.
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页数:26
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