Market reactions to voluntary disclosures of a strategic alliance agreement: evidence from China

被引:1
作者
Zhang, Xinyue [1 ]
Li, Wanli [1 ]
Gao, Simon [2 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian 710049, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Edinburgh Napier Univ, Business Sch, Edinburgh, Midlothian, Scotland
来源
SPANISH JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING-REVISTA ESPANOLA DE FINANCIACION Y CONTABILIDAD | 2023年 / 52卷 / 02期
关键词
Information preference; market reaction; qualitative information; strategic alliance agreements; regulation; voluntary disclosures; INFORMATION; INVESTORS; PERFORMANCE; FORECASTS; ANNOUNCEMENTS; ASSOCIATION; PREFERENCES; ENVIRONMENT; ATTENTION; ACCURACY;
D O I
10.1080/02102412.2022.2051322
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the market reaction to strategic alliance agreements (SAAs), a prevalent yet previously uninvestigated corporate voluntary disclosure practice. We document that investors react positively to SAA disclosures in short windows, and that the effect of SAA disclosures is transitory, since a reversal occurs within 30 days after the disclosure. We also find that the market reaction is weaker to an SAA involving the progress of existing cooperation projects and that markets react more positively to SAAs disclosed by firms that had released progress reports before. The results of cross-sectional tests indicate that investor sophistication and being a high-technology firm strengthen the association between SAA characteristics and market reactions. Finally, we document that market reaction decreased after the passage of the SAA format guidelines in 2015 and after firms have received a comment letter related to an SAA. Overall, our findings indicate that SAA disclosure is a crucial information resource for investors.
引用
收藏
页码:233 / 263
页数:31
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