Does public corruption affect analyst forecast quality?

被引：8

作者：

El Ghoul, Sadok ^{[1
]}

Guedhami, Omrane ^{[2
,3
]}

Wei, Zuobao ^{[4
]}

Zhu, Yicheng ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Alberta Campus St Jean, Edmonton, AB, Canada

[2] Univ South Carolina, Moore Sch Business, Columbia, SC USA

[3] Sungkyunkwan Univ SKKU, Sch Business, Seoul, South Korea

[4] Univ Texas Paso, Woody L Hunt Coll Business, El Paso, TX USA

[5] Drury Univ, Breech Sch Business Adm, Springfield, MO USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2023年 / 154卷

关键词：

Public corruption; Analyst forecast quality; Information asymmetry; U; S; States; POLITICAL CORRUPTION; INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; ACCURACY; CONNECTIONS; DIRECTORS; POLICY; FIRMS; COMPETITION; IMPROVE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106860

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Using U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) data on corruption convictions of government officials, we study the effect of public corruption on analyst forecast quality. We find that analyst earnings forecasts for firms headquartered in more corrupt states are less accurate. Our results are robust to endogeneity checks and several alternative corruption measures. In our cross-sectional analysis, we find that the negative effect of corruption on analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced in government contractor firms and firms with weaker internal governance or external monitoring. We further identify two channels through which corruption negatively influences analyst forecast accuracy: Firms in more corrupt states exhibit lower earnings quality and issue less frequent management guidance. & COPY; 2023 Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页数：18

共 105 条

[1] Rents, competition, and corruption [J].