Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining

被引：2

作者：

Haake, Claus-Jochen ^{[1
]}

Upmann, Thorsten ^{[2
,3
,4
]}

Duman, Papatya ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Paderborn Univ, DE-33098 Paderborn, Germany

[2] Carl von Ossietzky Univ Oldenburg, HIFMB, DE-23129 Oldenburg, Germany

[3] Carl von Ossietzky Univ Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany

[4] Bielefeld Univ, Bielefeld, Germany

来源：

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 125卷 / 02期

关键词：

Efficient bargains; labour market negotiations; Nash bargaining solution; restricted bargaining games; sequential bargaining; TRADE-UNIONS; MINIMUM-WAGES; LABOR; UNEMPLOYMENT; MODEL; FIRMS; BEHAVIOR; CHOICE; POWER; WORK;

D O I：

10.1111/sjoe.12518

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow. We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of "independence of irrelevant alternatives" is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems - and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.

引用

页码：403 / 440

页数：38