ESG controversies and corporate governance: Evidence from board size

被引:33
作者
Treepongkaruna, Sirimon [1 ,4 ]
Kyaw, Khine [2 ]
Jiraporn, Pornsit [3 ]
机构
[1] Chulalongkorn Univ, Sasin Sch Management, Bangkok, Thailand
[2] Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, NTNU Business Sch, Trondheim, Norway
[3] Penn State Univ, Great Valley Sch Grad Profess Studies, Malvern, PA USA
[4] Univ Western Australia, UWA Business Sch, Crawley, WA, Australia
关键词
board of directors; controversial activities board size; corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; ESG; ESG controversies; SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY CSR; FIRM VALUE EVIDENCE; INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; STAKEHOLDER THEORY; AGENCY COSTS; RETURNS; DETERMINANTS; LEGITIMACY; MANAGEMENT;
D O I
10.1002/bse.3697
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We show the influence the size of a corporate board has on firms' ESG controversies. Our analysis suggests that businesses with larger boards are more effective in mitigating ESG controversies. Specifically, a rise in board size by one standard deviation results in a decline in ESG controversies by 4.30%. Our findings corroborate the anticipation that businesses need the board's advice to prevent ESG controversies. Thus, larger boards, with more human capital and more interactions with stakeholders, promote sustainability more effectively. Moreover, we find that the effect of board size is less pronounced during a stressful time but is more evident in companies with more agency problems. Further analysis validates the findings, that is, propensity score matching, entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, and GMM dynamic panel data analysis.
引用
收藏
页码:4218 / 4232
页数:15
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