Game model of transnational green supply chain management considering government subsidies

被引:8
|
作者
Yi, Su [1 ]
Wen, Guo [1 ]
机构
[1] Harbin Engn Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Harbin 150001, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Transnational green supply chain; Product greenness; Import tariffs; Consumer green preference; Government subsidy; CONSUMER ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS; DECISION FRAMEWORK; COMPETITION; TARIFFS; MANUFACTURERS; EQUILIBRIUM; RESOURCES; IMPACT; QUOTAS; TRADE;
D O I
10.1007/s10479-023-05420-4
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Existing research shows that the practice of green supply chain management has a significant impact on the profits of supply chain members, but there is a lack of in-depth discussion on the issue of transnational green supply chain management in the case of government subsidies, especially the transmission effect of tariff effects and the countervailing effect between tariff effects and government subsidies. Based on a two-level transnational green supply chain composed of an exporting manufacturer and a retailer in an importing country, a Stackelberg game model is established in this paper. The effects of importing country tariffs, consumers' green preference, and the subsidy intensity of the government in the exporting country on decision-making, optimal profits of the transnational green supply chain and social welfare are discussed in the two cases of no government subsidy and a government subsidy. The results show that an increase in importing country tariffs will lead to an increase in the retail price of green products and a decrease in the greenness and wholesale price, as well as a reduction in social welfare and the profits of supply chain members. The impact of tariffs on the greenness and wholesale price of products is more significant than the impact of tariffs on retail prices. An increase in the green preference of consumers in the importing country can alleviate the adverse effects of tariffs to a certain extent. An increase in the intensity of the government subsidy will lead to an increase in product greenness, the wholesale price, the retail price, the profits of supply chain members and social welfare, and the growth rate of product greenness is much higher than the growth rate of wholesale and retail prices. Government subsidies can effectively reduce the negative impact of tariffs. Finally, numerical examples are used to further verify the research conclusions. The analysis in this paper has a reference value and offers significant guidance for the relevant decision-making of export manufacturers and the government in transnational green supply chain management.
引用
收藏
页数:22
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