Cross ownership and environmental corporate social responsibility with environmental cooperation

被引:17
作者
Cho, Sumi [1 ]
Lee, Sang-Ho [2 ]
机构
[1] Chonnam Natl Univ, Ctr Reg Dev, 77 Yongbong Ro, Gwangju 61186, South Korea
[2] Chonnam Natl Univ, Dept Econ, 77 Yongbong Ro, Gwangju 61186, South Korea
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
COMPETITION; PRIVATIZATION; INCENTIVES; PRICE;
D O I
10.1002/mde.4006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
When the cross owners of firms commit environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) as a commitment device to soften competition, environmental cooperation with their managers increases ECSR commitment levels. While lower degree of cross ownership between the firms reduces more emissions by increasing environmental R & D (ER & D) and improves welfare, higher degree of cross ownership causes both owners and managers to decrease ECSR and ER & D, which distorts environment and welfare, and these results can be expanded under environmental cooperation. In a coordination game, coordination failures can increase welfare when degrees of cross ownership are high and product markets are more competitive.
引用
收藏
页码:446 / 468
页数:23
相关论文
共 48 条
[1]   Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence [J].
Aggarwal, RK ;
Samwick, AA .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1999, 54 (06) :1999-2043
[2]   Spillovers, subsidies, and second-best socially optimal R&D [J].
Amir, Rabah ;
Liu, Huizhong ;
Machowska, Dominika ;
Resende, Joana .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 2019, 21 (06) :1200-1220
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2020, TIME HAS COME KPMG S
[4]  
Anton M., 2021, Innovation: The bright side of common ownership? Working Paper
[5]   Environmental corporate social responsibility, R&D and disclosure of ?green? innovation knowledge [J].
Barcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos ;
Garzon, Maria Begona ;
Sagasta, Amagoia .
ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2023, 120
[6]   Silent financial interests and product innovation [J].
Bayona, Anna ;
Lopez, Angel L. .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2018, 170 :109-112
[7]   Environmental delegation versus sales delegation: a game-theoretic analysis [J].
Buccella, Domenico ;
Fanti, Luciano ;
Gori, Luca .
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2023, 28 (05) :469-485
[8]   'Green' managerial delegation theory [J].
Buccella, Domenico ;
Fanti, Luciano ;
Gori, Luca .
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2022, 27 (03) :223-249
[9]   To abate, or not to abate? A strategic approach on green production in Cournot and Bertrand duopolies [J].
Buccella, Domenico ;
Fanti, Luciano ;
Gori, Luca .
ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2021, 96
[10]   Environmental policies with consumer-friendly firms and cross-ownership [J].
Carlos Barcena-Ruiz, Juan ;
Sagasta, Amagoia .
ECONOMIC MODELLING, 2021, 103