Bank shareholder network and board governance: Evidence from Chinese commercial banks

被引:4
作者
Wang, Li [1 ]
Huang, Zeyu [2 ]
Wang, Yanan [3 ]
机构
[1] East China Normal Univ, Fac Econ & Management, Shanghai 200241, Peoples R China
[2] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[3] South China Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Finance, Guangzhou Univ Town Campus, Guangzhou 510006, Peoples R China
来源
JOURNAL OF INNOVATION & KNOWLEDGE | 2023年 / 8卷 / 04期
关键词
Bank shareholder network; Bank board governance; Information sharing; Reputation incentives; Effective connections; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SOCIAL NETWORKS; SMALL-WORLD; PERFORMANCE; CENTRALITY; OWNERSHIP; CONNECTIONS; INCENTIVES; DIRECTORS; INDUSTRY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jik.2023.100412
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Board governance is an important aspect of internal bank governance. We conduct an empirical study on 100 banks in China for the period from 2004 to 2017 using a time-varying growth bank shareholder network to investigate the relationship and mechanism between bank shareholder network and board governance. The bank shareholder network is found to have a positive impact on board governance. This positive effect differs across bank's service areas and ownership properties, indicating a reinforcing weakness effect. The empirical analysis shows that enhancement of network centrality can improve board governance in a bank shareholder network through three mechanisms: information sharing, reputation incentives, and effective connections. These findings provide new evidence for applying social networks in the financial services industry and identify policy implications for improving internal governance from an informal institutional perspective. & COPY; 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Espana, S.L.U. on behalf of Journal of Innovation & Knowledge. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 71 条
  • [1] A theory of friendly boards
    Adams, Renee B.
    Ferreira, Daniel
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2007, 62 (01) : 217 - 250
  • [2] Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies
    Adams, Renee B.
    Mehran, Hamid
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 2012, 21 (02) : 243 - 267
  • [3] Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors' Incentives to Attend Board Meetings
    Adams, Renee Birgit
    Ferreira, Daniel
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, 2012, 12 (02) : 227 - 248
  • [4] The evolutionary similarity of the co-shareholder relationship network from institutional and non-institutional shareholder perspectives
    An, Pengli
    Zhou, Jinsheng
    Li, Huajiao
    Sun, Bowen
    Shi, Yanli
    [J]. PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS, 2018, 503 : 439 - 450
  • [5] Do banks change their liquidity ratios based on network characteristics?
    Ardekani, Aref Mahdavi
    Distinguin, Isabelle
    Tarazi, Amine
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2020, 285 (02) : 789 - 803
  • [6] Institutional investor networks and firm value
    Bajo, Emanuele
    Croci, Ettore
    Marinelli, Nicoletta
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, 2020, 112 : 65 - 80
  • [7] Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite's Small World and the Effectiveness of Boards of Directors
    Bang Dang Nguyen
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2012, 58 (02) : 236 - 252
  • [8] Why bank governance is different
    Becht, Marco
    Bolton, Patrick
    Roeell, Ailsa
    [J]. OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 2011, 27 (03) : 437 - 463
  • [9] FACTORING AND WEIGHTING APPROACHES TO STATUS SCORES AND CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION
    BONACICH, P
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY, 1972, 2 (01) : 113 - 120
  • [10] Interconnectedness in the interbank market
    Brunetti, Celso
    Harris, Jeffrey H.
    Mankad, Shawn
    Michailidis, George
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2019, 133 (02) : 520 - 538