Geographic deregulation and bank capital structure

被引:10
作者
Berger, Allen N. [1 ]
Oztekin, Oezde [2 ]
Roman, Raluca A. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ South Carolina, Ctr Financial Inst Darla Moore Sch Business, European Banking Ctr, Wharton Financial Inst Ctr, Columbia, SC USA
[2] Florida Int Univ, Miami, FL 33199 USA
[3] Fed Reserve Bank Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA USA
关键词
Capital structure; Bank capital; Target capital; Adjustment speed; Geographic deregulation; Banking; Banking regulation; FRACTIONAL RESPONSE VARIABLES; MARKET DISCIPLINE; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; DEPOSIT INSURANCE; PUBLIC-POLICY; COMPETITION; RISK; IMPACT; TRADE; FAILURES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106761
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The literature demonstrates numerous consequences of bank geographic deregulation, but neglects bank capital structure - critical to performance, resilience, and prudential regulation/supervision. We supply first-time evidence on geographic deregulation effects on bank capital. We also distinguish and test two novel mechanisms through which geographic deregulation may affect bank behavior. The competitive defense and competitive offense mechanisms differentiate deregulation effects in increasing external competitive pressures on banks versus expanding banks' capacity to compete externally. We find statistically and economically significant evidence of geographic deregulation effects on two bank capital management tools - target capital ratios and speeds of adjustment to these targets - yielding higher targets and faster adjustment. Findings are robust to addressing identification concerns using dynamic panel methodology, a gravity-deregulation approach, and time-varying bank-specific instruments. The data also support both the competitive defense and competitive offense mechanisms, suggesting future research and policy applications of these mechanisms to banking and more generally. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:19
相关论文
共 106 条
[1]   Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There Is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting [J].
Acharya, Viral V. ;
Mehran, Hamid ;
Thakor, Anjan V. .
REVIEW OF CORPORATE FINANCE STUDIES, 2016, 5 (01) :36-75
[2]  
Admati AnatR., 2013, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive
[3]  
ANDERSEN LC, 1969, J FINANC, V24, P207
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2017, Global Financial Stability Report
[5]   Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix [J].
Ashcraft, Adam B. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 2008, 17 (04) :543-561
[6]  
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 2017, 87 ANN REP
[7]   Incentive compensation for bank directors: The impact of deregulation [J].
Becher, DA ;
Campbell, TL ;
Frye, MB .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 2005, 78 (05) :1753-1777
[8]   Does regulation substitute or complement governance? [J].
Becher, David A. ;
Frye, Melissa B. .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2011, 35 (03) :736-751
[9]   Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States [J].
Beck, Thorsten ;
Levine, Ross ;
Levkov, Alexey .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2010, 65 (05) :1637-1667
[10]   How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios? [J].
Berger, Allen N. ;
DeYoung, Robert ;
Flannery, Mark J. ;
Lee, David ;
Oeztekin, Oezde .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH, 2008, 34 (2-3) :123-149