Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

被引：1

作者：

Barlo, Mehmet ^{[1
]}

Dalkiran, Nuh Ayguen ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Sabanci Univ, Fac Arts & Social Sci, Tuzla, Turkiye

[2] Bilkent Univ, Dept Econ, Bilkent, Turkiye

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2023年 / 213卷

关键词：

Behavioral implementation; Incomplete information; Interim implementation; Behavioral interim incentive efficiency; RATIONALIZABLE IMPLEMENTATION; CHOICE FUNCTIONS; MASKIN THEOREM; NASH;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate implementation under incomplete information allowing for individuals' choices featuring violations of rationality. Our primitives are individuals' interim choices that do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We also introduce behavioral interim incentive Pareto efficiency and investigate its implementability under incomplete information. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：24

共 44 条

[1] Implementation with a sympathizer [J].