Franz Brentano's Conception of the Object and its Intentional Inexistence

In line with earlier works, this article argues for a "continuist" interpretation of Brentano's conception of intentionality. It maintains that Brentano's conception of intentionality rests on a complex set of notions, which are reduced to a minimal core or applied more fully depending on the complexity of the mental phenomenon under consideration and perspective from which it is analyzed. The article positions this con-ceptual structure in relation to theories of objects developed within the framework of late-and Neo-Scholastic philosophy where, since the psychic act can relate to its object in different ways, the different types and roles of objects must be distinguished. This theory of objects enables Brentano to reinterpret Aristoteles's idea of the inten-tionality of mental phenomena in light of the commentaries and interpretations of Thomas Aquinas while also giving space to other medieval texts.