A pricing mechanism to jointly mitigate market power and environmental externalities in electricity markets

被引:6
|
作者
Varawala, Lamia [1 ]
Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza [1 ]
Dan, Gyorgy [1 ]
Bunn, Derek [2 ]
Rosellon, Juan [3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] KTH Royal Inst Technol, Brinellvagen 8, S-11428 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] London Business Sch, Regents Pk, London NW1 4SA, England
[3] Ctr Invest & Docencia Econ, Carr Mexico Toluca 3655, Mexico City 01210, DF, Mexico
[4] DIW Berlin, Mohrenstr 58, D-10117 Berlin, Germany
[5] Baker Inst Publ Policy, 6100 Main St, Baker Hall MS 40, Suite 120, Houston, TX 77005 USA
[6] Univ Barcelona, Tinent Coronel Valenzuela 1 11, Barcelona 08034, Spain
关键词
Electricity; Market power; Environmental externalities; Price caps; Incentives; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; SUBSIDY;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106646
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The electricity industry has been one of the first to face technological changes motivated by sustainability concerns. Whilst efficiency aspects of market design have tended to focus upon market power concerns, the new policy challenges emphasise sustainability. We argue that market designs need to develop remedies for market conduct integrated with regard to environmental externalities. Accordingly, we develop an incentive-based market clearing mechanism using a power network representation with a distinctive feature of incomplete information regarding generation costs. The shortcomings of price caps to mitigate market power, in this context, are overcome with the proposed mechanism.
引用
收藏
页数:14
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