Matching with Externalities

被引：7

作者：

Pycia, Marek ^{[1
]}

Yenmez, M. Bumin ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

[2] Boston Coll, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2023年 / 90卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Matching with externalities; Deferred acceptance algorithm; Substitutability; Labour markets with couples; C78; D47; D62; STABLE MATCHINGS; COALITION-FORMATION; SCHOOL CHOICE; POWER COUPLES; STABILITY; MARKETS; ASSIGNMENT; PREFERENCES; SUBSTITUTES; INCENTIVES;

D O I：

10.1093/restud/rdac032

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.

引用

页码：948 / 974

页数：27

共 84 条

[1] On a characterization of stable matchings [J].