The disputes in the South China Sea have been at an impasse for decades. Phases of escalation and de-escalation alternate, but there has been little significant progress towards a sustainable solution. This is surprising since resolution mechanisms exist, most notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but also a number of other options including some developed by lawyers, political scientists and historians. The question is not whether the conflict is resolvable, but whether the various actors have the will to resolve it. This article argues that the willingness to resolve the disputes through compromise varies depending upon the type of nationalist narrative that prevails in the claimant country and how closely that narrative is linked to the system of rule. To this end, the nationalisms of the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and the People's Republic of China are contrasted. It follows from the analysis that the People's Republic of China and Vietnam, insofar as they are unable to obtain their maximal claims, have an interest in maintaining the conflict, as it can be a useful, albeit risky, tool for legitimizing their one-party political systems.