Welfare Consequence of Common Ownership in a Vertically Related Market

被引：15
|
作者：
Chen, Linfeng [1 ]
Matsumura, Toshihiro [2 ]
Zeng, Chenhang [3 ]
机构：
[1] Zhejiang Gongshang Univ, Hangzhou Coll Commerce, Dept Econ, Hangzhou, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Tokyo, Inst Social Sci, 7-3-1 Hongo,Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 1130033, Japan
[3] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Wenlan Sch Business, 182 Nanhu Ave, Wuhan, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 2024年 / 72卷 / 02期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金; 日本学术振兴会;
关键词：
COMPETITION;
D O I：
10.1111/joie.12380
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We investigate how common ownership affects welfare in a vertically related market. Although common ownership mitigates the double marginalization problem and improves welfare, it restricts competition among downstream firms and harms welfare. We find that whether common ownership is welfare-improving depends on the degree of competitiveness in the downstream market. Common ownership is more likely to improve welfare when there are fewer downstream firms and a greater degree of product differentiation. In other words, common ownership may improve welfare when competition in the downstream market is weak.
引用
收藏
页码：996 / 1004
页数：9
相关论文
共 50 条
12345